



SN5: How therapeutic equivalence can influence the cost of drugs

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Barcelona, March 2014



**Conflict of interest:
nothing to disclose**

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Learning objectives:

To estimate the impact of strategies developed by the pharmaceutical industry to prolong the life of their successful products



To be sensitized to the importance of considering a societal perspective when economic choices have to be done



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PLOS MEDICINE

Patented Drug Extension Strategies on Healthcare Spending: A Cost-Evaluation Analysis

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
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Chiral drugs



Same chemical structure

Different 3dimentontal arrangements

The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 2001

William S. Knowles,
Ryoji Noyori,
K. Barry Sharpless



Somogyi A. BF, Foster D (2004) Inside the isomers: the tale of chiral switches. Australian Prescriber 27: 47-49

Agranat I, Caner H, Caldwell J (2002) Putting chirality to work: the strategy of chiral switches. Nat Rev Drug Discov 1: 753-768



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Potential Health benefits

Different pharmacodynamic and pharmacokinetic properties

- Improved safety margin through increased receptor selectivity?
- Reduce side effects? => more appropriate dosing frequency?
- a longer or shorter duration of action?
- decreased inter-individual variability?
- decreased potential for drug-drug interactions?

Somogyi A. BF, Foster D (2004) Inside the isomers: the tale of chiral switches. Australian Prescriber 27: 47-49

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Clinical Evidence



Rare clinical study facing "head to Head" or
40mg esomeprazole compared to 20 mg d'omeprazole
 Lind, T., et al. Aliment Pharmacol Ther. 2000. 14(7); p. 861-7.

Somogyi A, BF, Foster D (2004) Inside the isomers: the tale of chiral switches. Australian Prescriber 27: 47-49
"Need to be provided ... that chiral switches have advantages for the prescriber and the consumer"

Hughes DA, Ferner RE New drugs for old: disinvestment and NICE. Brmj 340: c572
"any resulting improvement in health outcome, is often lacking"

Svensson S, Mansfield PR (2004) Escitalopram: superior to citalopram or a chiral chimera? Psychother Psychosom 73: 10-16.
"Methodological flaws in the trials... superiority for escitalopram over citalopram are unwarranted"

Agranat I, Caner H, Caldwell J (2002) Putting chirality to work: the strategy of chiral switches. Nat Rev Drug Discov 1: 753-768
"The chiral switch is a **useful option for the owners of existing racemate to achieve line extensions, especially if the switch can be marketed immediately before expiry of patent on the racemate"**

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EPGL

Evergreening strategies

3 categories of drugs marketed

at the same time
 at different prices
 by the same pharmaceutical company (1 & 2)



- 1) the initially patented drug
- 2) the **follow-on drug: slightly modified drugs of already approved drugs**
- 3) the generic version of the brand drug



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EPGL

Evergreening strategies

Combination formulations

alendronic acid combined **with** colecalciferol - alendronic acid alone
simvastatin combined **with** ezetimibe - simvastatin alone

Structural analogues

pregabalin for gabapentin

Active metabolic

desloratadine for loratadine

Slow-release forms

zolpidem **extended release**

Single enantiomer

omeprazole – **eso**meprazole; citalopram – **es**citalopram
cetirizine – **levo**cetirizine



Patents: eligibility criteria

“non obvious”

- Base compound or active ingredient
- Related chemical structure and compositions or formulations
 - prodrug
 - polymorph
- Manufacturing methods and processes
- Method of treatment
 - New use
 - Other diseases

A. T. Kesselheim et al. Health Aff (Millwood)



Patents: eligibility criteria



Ritonavir et lopinavir/ritonavir

- 108 additional patents -> 2028

Patent categories	Ritonavir	Lopinavir	Lopinavir/ritonavir	Ritonavir and/or lopinavir with other compounds	Total
Total	→	→	→	→	210
Base compound or active ingredient	1	1	0	0	2
RELATED CHEMICAL STRUCTURES AND COMPOSITIONS OR FORMULATIONS (82)					
Composition and formulation	18	9	15	7	49
Intermediate compounds	13	9	0	0	22
Polymorphs	2	2	0	0	4
Prodrugs	2	2	1	1	6
MANUFACTURING METHODS AND PROCESSES (86)					
Processes	36	27	5	0	68
METHODS OF TREATMENT OF HIV INFECTION AND OTHER DISEASES (21)					
First method of treatment or administration for HIV	4	4	5	5	18
New uses for HIV or other diseases	6	1	1	5	13
GENERAL PATENTS (28)					
General formulations	→	→	→	→	5
Processes and methods for preparing general formulations	→	→	→	→	11
Other technologies or test systems	→	→	→	→	12


SOURCE: Authors' analysis. **NOTE:** Intermediate compounds, polymorphs, and prodrugs are defined in the text. ¹Not applicable, because the categories are not mutually exclusive, patents with claims in more than one category are listed more than once. ²Includes combinations with other HIV-treating compounds, salt forms, ester derivatives, and dosage forms. ³Processes for making analogs, intermediates, formulations, formulations or compositions, and polymorphs. ⁴General patents that could be applied to ritonavir, lopinavir, or both.

A. T. Kesselheim et al. Health Aff 2013



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Price of innovation



Estimated drug cost:

- \$802 million in 2000 par molécule
- \$1,318 million in 2005 biologiques

Patent last 20 years

DiMasi, J. A., Hansen, R. W. & Grabowski, H. G. The price of innovation: new estimates of drug development costs. *J. Health Econ.* **22**, 151-185 (2003).

DiMasi, J. A., Grabowski, H. G. The cost of biopharmaceutical R&D. *Manage. Decis. Econ.* **28**, 469-479 (2007).

Interpharma, *Le marché du médicament en Suisse*, 2006



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Life cycle management

Stratégies des laboratoires pour faire le développement des génériques pour les dix molécules étudiées

Molécule	Stratégies des laboratoires				
	Stratégie 1	Stratégie 2	Stratégie 3	Stratégie 4	Stratégie 5
Amoxicilline	Amoxicilline (MS, USA)	Amoxicilline (MS, USA)	Amoxicilline (MS, USA)	Amoxicilline (MS, USA)	Amoxicilline (MS, USA)
Aspirine	Aspirine (MS, USA)	Aspirine (MS, USA)	Aspirine (MS, USA)	Aspirine (MS, USA)	Aspirine (MS, USA)
Clonidine	Clonidine (MS, USA)	Clonidine (MS, USA)	Clonidine (MS, USA)	Clonidine (MS, USA)	Clonidine (MS, USA)
Diltiazem	Diltiazem (MS, USA)	Diltiazem (MS, USA)	Diltiazem (MS, USA)	Diltiazem (MS, USA)	Diltiazem (MS, USA)
Fluoxetine	Fluoxetine (MS, USA)	Fluoxetine (MS, USA)	Fluoxetine (MS, USA)	Fluoxetine (MS, USA)	Fluoxetine (MS, USA)
Paracétamol	Paracétamol (MS, USA)	Paracétamol (MS, USA)	Paracétamol (MS, USA)	Paracétamol (MS, USA)	Paracétamol (MS, USA)
Valproate	Valproate (MS, USA)	Valproate (MS, USA)	Valproate (MS, USA)	Valproate (MS, USA)	Valproate (MS, USA)
Zidovudine	Zidovudine (MS, USA)	Zidovudine (MS, USA)	Zidovudine (MS, USA)	Zidovudine (MS, USA)	Zidovudine (MS, USA)

Profit maximisation



Grandfils, N., V. Paris, and C. Semet. Les laboratoires pharmaceutiques face à l'arrivée des génériques: quelles stratégies pour quels effets?. in Institut de recherche et documentation m économie de santé. 2004, 84.



Objectives:

- 1) Drug company invent a new drug
a patent (20 years)
monopoly
make profit
- 2) After 20 years
generic companies
prices competition
- 3) Patent and market slightly modified drugs

hypothesis: maximise their profit



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Squeezing the balloon

Pressure applied in one area pushes the air into another area of less resistance



Financial reduction expected from the generics would not be as effective in reality



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Setting & methods

- The database of Swiss pharmacist's organisation OFAC
 - Administrative intermediary for 92% of affiliated pharmacies
 - Covers 80% of the insureds population
- Study period: 2000 to 2008
- Simulation techniques




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Costs: 3 categories of drugs

	Euro (millions) (95% CI)
total	173.208 (173.171 - 173.246)
Brand	103.744 (103.713 - 103.775)
Follow-on	41.835 (41.817 - 41.854)
Generic	27.629 (27.619 - 27.640)

omeprazole - esomeprazole
citalopram - escitalopram
simvastatin - simvastatin and ezetimibe
alendronic acid - alendronic acid and colecalciferol
zolpidem - zolpidem CR
loratidine - desloratidine
gabapentin - pregabalin
cetirizine - levocetirizine




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Swiss regulations

2001: Pharmacists ->
generic substitution

2006: a 20% patient
co-payment



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Extra Costs

3 scenarios

Assume the replacement with the corresponding generic equivalent when available for prescriptions of


- Scenario 1: All follow-on drugs (no evergreening strategies)
- Scenario 2: All brand drugs (no brands drugs)
- Scenario 3: All brand & follow-on drugs

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Extra Costs

	Euro (millions) [CI95%]
No evergreening	14 546 [14 495;14 597]
No brand	15 816 [15 765;15 867]
No evergreening, no brand	30 362 [30 313;30 411]



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

Extra Costs

	Scenario 1 (no evergreening)			Scenario 2 (no original)			Scenario 3 (no evergreening, no original)		
	Euro (millions)	[CI95%]	% of total	Euro (millions)	[CI95%]	% of total	Euro (millions)	[CI95%]	% of total
omeprazole - esomeprazole	5-262	[5-225;5-299]	36-2%	7294	[7-259;7-329]	46-1%	12-556	[12-521;12-591]	41-4%
citalopram - escitalopram	4-873	[4-851;4-895]	33-5%	4795	[4-773;4-817]	30-3%	9-668	[9-548;9-688]	31-8%
simvastatin - simvastatin et ezetimibe	2-636	[2-620;2-652]	18-1%	2697	[2-679;2-715]	17-1%	5333	[5-317;5-349]	17-6%
alendronic acid - alendronic acid and colecalciferol	203	[189;217]	1-4%	199	[185;213]	1-3%	402	[388;416]	1-3%
zolpidem - zolpidem CR	64	[58;70]	0-4%	418	[412;424]	2-6%	482	[476;488]	1-6%
loratidine - desloratidine	371	[367;375]	2-6%	43	[37;49]	0-3%	414	[410;418]	1-4%
gabapentin - pregabalin	630	[612;648]	4-3%	132	[114;150]	0-8%	762	[744;780]	2-5%
cetirizine - levocetirizine	507	[501;513]	3-5%	238	[232;244]	1-5%	745	[739;751]	2-5%
Total	14-546	[14-495;14-597]		15-816	[15-765;15-867]		30-362	[30-313;30-411]	

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Esomeprazole - omeprazole



Spillover effect

Action taken in one environment impacts another environment



Tribune de Genève, 4 mars 2011

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Spillover effect

PacifiCare®

omeprazole-lansoprazole
↓
Rabeprazole-pantoprazole

~~**PacifiCare®**~~

↗ Rabeprazole
↗ pantoprazole

Wang, Y.R. and M.V. Pauly. Spillover effects of restrictive drug formularies: a case study of PacifiCare in California. *Am J Manag Care*, 2005. 11(1): p. 24-6.



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Restrictive drug formularies



Hospitals:

- to minimise acquisition costs
- to limit the number of medications available
- to teach



Pharmaceutical companies:

- to buy and use their drug
- spillover effect

Hypothesis

Hospital prescription patterns may influence prescription patterns in the community

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Settings & Methods



(1) inpatient setting (during hospitalisation)

2000 beds

(1) hospital spillover setting: medications prescribed by HUG physicians but dispensed by community pharmacies



(1) community setting

464'000 inhabitants

- The hospital registry & OFAC database
- Study period: 2000 to 2008
- Simulation techniques & Time Series analysis

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Different rules

community setting

the inpatient setting

⌘ hospital spillover setting (mg)

Prices
fixed

Drug prices
negotiated



Prescriptions
unrestricted

Prescriptions
restricted



Prescribing market share

$$\frac{\% \text{ follow-on (DDD)}}{\text{brand+generic+follow-on (DDD)}}$$





Muijers PE et al (2005) Fam Pract 22: 624-630



Prescribing market share

$$\frac{\% \text{ ESO (DDD)}}{\text{brand OME} + \text{generic OME} + \text{ESO (DDD)}}$$




Muijers PE et al (2005) Fam Pract 22: 624-630

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Defined Daily Dose



Interpharma, *Le marché du médicament en Suisse*, 2008




Ex: Co-Amoxiclav
80 references

http://www.whocc.no/atc_ddd_index/



Spillover effect



100% evergreening
All PPI prescriptions are switched to esomeprazole at admission from October 2002


0% evergreening
levocetirizine or brand cetirizine prescriptions are switched at admission from septembre 2004

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Spillover extra costs




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« Hospital RDF »



	Decision for the RDF	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2000 - 2008
omeprazole - esomeprazole	In October 2002 the RDF switched from omeprazole to esomeprazole. All the PPI prescriptions are switched to esomeprazole at admission.	13-0 [8-4;17-5]	53-0 [48-5;57-5]	-0-9 [-5-3;3-5]	30-3 [26-1;34-4]	27-4 [23-3;31-6]	71-4 [67-4;75-4]	81-1 [77-1;85-1]	54-5 [50-9;58-0]	329-7 [317-2;342-3]
citalopram - escitalopram	RDF switched to the generic citalopram in December 2003. Escitalopram is unrestricted.	0 [-2-3;2-3]	1-2 [-1-0;3-4]	6-0 [3-5;8-4]	24-8 [22-3;27-3]	36-3 [33-9;38-7]	52-5 [50-2;54-8]	42-9 [40-8;45-1]	29-8 [27-9;31-6]	193-5 [186-6;200-4]
gabapentin - pregabalin	RDF switched to the generic gabapentin in February 2008. Pregabalin is unrestricted.	0 [-1-8;1-8]	0 [-1-9;1-9]	0 [-2-2;2-2]	0 [-2-5;2-5]	1-2 [-1-4;3-9]	4-0 [1-3;6-6]	3-0 [0-3;5-7]	0-7 [-2-1;3-6]	9-0 [1-9;16-0]
zolpidem - zolpidem CR	RDF switched brand zolpidem to generic in June 2006. Modified release zolpidem is restricted.	0 [-0-5;0-5]	0 [-0-6;0-60]	0 [-0-6;0-6]	0 [-0-6;0-6]	0-8 [0-2;1-5]	1-4 [0-9;2-0]	1-1 [0-6;1-6]	1-0 [0-5;1-5]	4-3 [2-7;6-0]
loratidine - desloratidine	RDF switched brand to generic loratidine and desloratidine to generic cetirizine in February 2006 at admission.	0 [-0-3;0-3]	0 [-0-4;0-4]	0 [-0-4;0-4]	0 [-0-5;0-4]	0 [-0-5;0-4]	0-3 [-0-1;0-7]	0-6 [0-2;0-9]	0-3 [-0-0;7]	1-1 [0-0;2-2]
alendronic acid - alendronic acid and colecalciferol	Neither alendronic acid nor its combination is included in the RDF. Those prescriptions are unrestricted.	0 [-0-8;0-8]	0 [-1-0;1-0]	0 [-1-1;1-1]	0 [-1-1;1-1]	0 [-1-2;1-2]	0 [-1-2;1-2]	-1-5 [-2-6;-0-5]	0 [-0-8;0-8]	-1-5 [-4-6;1-5]
cetirizine - levocetirizine	RDF switched brand cetirizine and levocetirizine to generic in December 2004 at admission.	0 [-0-4;0-4]	0 [-0-1;0-8]	0 [-0-5;0-5]	0 [-0-5;0-6]	-0-2 [-0-7;0-3]	-0-7 [-1-2;-0-2]	-2-1 [-2-60;-1-6]	-2-7 [-3-2;-2-3]	-5-3 [-6-7;-3-9]
simvastatin - simvastatin and ezetimibe	RDF switched brand simvastatin to generic in August 2004. Combined simvastatin and ezetimibe are unrestricted.	0 [-1-4;1-4]	0 [-1-3;1-3]	0 [-1-2;1-2]	9-5 [8-3;10-7]	21-8 [20-8;22-8]	-11-3 [-12-1;-10-5]	-21-3 [-22-2;-20-3]	-18-0 [-19-1;-16-8]	-19-1 [-22-8;-15-5]
Total		13-0 [7-3;18-7]	54-7 [49-0;60-3]	5-0 [-0-8;10-9]	64-6 [58-8;70-4]	88-3 [82-5;94-1]	118-9 [113-3;124-6]	105-0 [99-4;11-0]	66-5 [61-4;71-7]	516-0 [499-1;532-9]



Strengths & limitations

Strengths

- robust data
73% of the total of insured patients
- robust methodology

Limitations

- some patients may benefit
- substitution
- promotional activities

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Conclusions

Spillover effect

Financial impact of listing drugs in hospital restrictive drug formularies on the healthcare system as a whole

Evergreening strategies

Financial impact of the evergreening strategies on overall healthcare costs

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